



INSIGHTS ON THE IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM



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TABLE OF CONTENT

<i>Figures</i>	<i>viii</i>
<i>Acronyms and Abbreviations</i>	<i>x</i>
<i>First Thoughts</i>	<i>XI</i>
<i>Foreword</i>	<i>XII</i>
<i>Acknowledgement</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Background</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>Scope</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Literature Review</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>The Legal and Statutory provisions underpinning CVE in Kenya</i>	<i>10</i>
.....	
<i>National</i>	<i>11</i>
<i>The National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (2016)</i>	<i>11</i>
<i>The Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA)</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>The Security Laws Amendment Act (SLAA)</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>The Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA)</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>The Firearms Act</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>The Explosives Act</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>The Basic Education Act</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>The Non-governmental Organizations Coordination Act</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>The Persons Deprived of Liberty Act (PDLA)</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>The Prisons Act</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>The County Governments Act (CGA)</i>	<i>13</i>
.....	
<i>Regional</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>The IGAD Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism</i>	<i>14</i>
.....	
<i>International</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>United Nations Declarations</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council</i>	<i>15</i>
.....	
<i>The Research Methodology</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Questionnaire</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Part I</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Part II</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>Part III</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>The Kenya Prison Service</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>The Education Sector</i>	<i>22</i>
.....	
<i>Key research findings</i>	<i>23</i>
<i>Ease of access to the NSCVE document itself.</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Lack of monitoring and evaluation/ reporting</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>The County Action Plans are based on different strategies</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Conversations on CT and CVE are shrouded in mystery</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>To be responsive to the fluid nature of CVE time is of the essence</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>The platforms for radicalization have changed</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>The wide gap of knowledge between professionals and civilians</i>	<i>24</i>
.....	
<i>Appendices</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>The Questionnaire</i>	<i>25</i>

FIGURES

<i>Figure 2:</i> <i>Graphical representation of the success of Priority 1 of the NSCVE</i>	30
<i>Figure 3:</i> <i>Graphical representation of the success of Priority 2 of the NSCVE</i>	30
<i>Figure 4:</i> <i>How the NSCVE has supported local communities by addressing communal grievances</i>	31
<i>Figure 5:</i> <i>Opinion as to the success of rehabilitation and reintegration support</i>	32
<i>Figure 6:</i> <i>Illustration of the level of achievement of Priority 8 of the NSCVE</i>	33
<i>Figure 7:</i> <i>Knowledge on Priority 9 on clear pathways and guidelines to effectively and productively engage in CVE</i>	34
<i>Figure 8:</i> <i>Respondents' view on whether or not the NSCVE had been successful 4 years later</i>	35

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ATPU	<i>Anti-Terrorism Police Unit</i>
CAP	<i>County Action Plan</i>
CVE	<i>Countering Violent Extremism</i>
FTF	<i>Foreign Terrorist Fighters</i>
GoK	<i>Government of Kenya</i>
IGAD	<i>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</i>
KPS	<i>Kenya Prisons Service</i>
NCTC	<i>National Counter Terrorism Centre</i>
NPS	<i>National Police Service</i>
NSCVE	<i>National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism</i>
ODPP	<i>Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions</i>
POCA	<i>Prevention of Organised Crime Act</i>
POCAMLA	<i>Proceeds of Crime and Anti Money Laundering Act</i>
POTA	<i>Prevention of Terrorism Act</i>
VE	<i>Violent Extremism</i>

FIRST THOUGHTS

The arena of radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism is one that is shrouded in secrecy almost by default. Any deliberate act or omission that is targeted at a particular group so as to achieve political gain (which is the broader definition of terrorism) is not overt. With increasing regularity, it also is not confined to any geographical location. The world truly is being converted into a village and in the realm of (CT) Counter Terrorism, radicalization, development of extremist beliefs and the actualization of these beliefs through acts of terror is being conducted from the comfort of people's homes and without the need for physical space.

Technology is also advancing at a rapid pace which presents new frontiers for terrorists and would-be violent extremists. The use of crypto currency and digital commerce platforms has made it easy to access money and move it across continents incognito. This can be used to offer training and buy equipment to facilitate terrorist activity.

These changes occur rapidly, oftentimes too quickly for the state to respond. This begs several questions then; in developing strategies to counter radicalization, violent extremism or terrorism, are these in tune with the threat or do they lag behind? Are they capable of execution within a short period or do they conform to the rather traditional 5-year period for strategies? Are they fluid and adaptive or rigid and slow?

A good strategy ought to target the threat and not the group. Many times, CVE strategies respond to a particular outfit or group forgetting to respond to the drivers of radicalization in the first place and the centers of gravity of these activities. Al Qaeda, ISIS and Al Shabaab will always rise and fall and lose territorial control. But it is what lingers in people's hearts and minds where the real battlefield lies. This is a war of ideology, of the unseen, of the innate. How will we strategize to defeat that? Deliberate lines of action need to be drawn fully cognizant of the state of war with discernible options. Strategize, yes, better yet, win the war.


All this against a public that is increasingly aware of their rights, vigorously defensive of their stature and freedoms and intolerant to any incidences of abuse. A public that demands of its state, to know what the state wants to do, why, against whom and for whose benefit. The secrecy seemingly becoming disproportionate; the public not wanting you to know what they're doing but demanding full access to what the state is doing. Citizens holding up the 'human rights' card and demanding that suspects, no matter how vilified by the state be accorded due process and allowed their day in court. Access to information is no longer child's play it is a necessity.

So, in developing a strategy to counter violent extremism, what becomes the baseline? What does a state do to protect its borders and citizens while ensuring that those who violate the law are punished? Do the structures support an all-access system or is some information held back from the public? How will success be measured then if what is to be done remains in the knowledge of a select few? Will lack of information breed more contempt or endear the population the rulers?

These are not easy balls to juggle, and the likelihood of a few falling and breaking is real. A lot can be achieved, however, through inclusivity and public dialogue before, during and after the various stages of implementation of a CVE strategy. Understanding the threat and developing a holistic governmental approach is critical to success as well. Third, constant reflection, monitoring and evaluation is inescapable if the rights tools are to be developed to counter the threat.

A good CVE strategy must be progressive and win over hearts and minds. Prevent the action from taking place and not responding to situations is the best approach.

Kenya has a national CVE strategy that has been in place since 2016. The question is does it meet the legitimate expectations of what a good strategy should be? Does it solve more than what it breeds? Critically, does it respond to the ever-changing threat posed by CVE? Time will tell



Eric Mukoya,

Executive Director, Legal Resources Foundation Trust

FOREWORD

The ideological pillar of the National Counter Violence Extremism Strategy is the key to Kenya's counter terrorism and prevention of extremism, especially in promoting cohesion, religious and ethnic respect. Our CVE work embraces the whole society approach with all citizens as trustees of the Republic of Kenya. These should include inter-faith and intra-faith dialogue: civil awareness and the embrace of our diverse cultures and heritage. It is legal foundation in the 2010 constitution.

This sustained work limits the spread of the terrorist's radicalizing message. It further lays the groundwork for the public, and more importantly the audience the terrorist are trying to sway, to regard the attackers with contempt. This will limit recruitment and their cultural and political pillar.

All people of Kenya including the religious congregation's and leaders have been brought on board to join the National and County level CVE work. The response I am pleased to say has been enthusiastic and successful.

Kenya security services also deploy to protect at risk and vulnerable soft targets. In parts of the country bordering Somalia where Al Shabaab has carried out cross-border attacks, police officers have stationed at places considered high risk but vulnerable soft targets. It is a priority deployment that reflects the government's conviction that the center of gravity in countering terrorism is the people and their freedoms.

In government, National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), activity promotes a protective security culture in the management of learning institutions including religious facilities and other highly trafficked institutions. We are happy to offer security risk assessments and advice on adjustments in the institution's security enhancing practices.

These include adoption of Security by Designs (SBD) standard of architecture, effective partnership with ICT certified private security companies, awareness creation and training in countering terrorism and violent extremism. We should count the inclusivity of all Kenyans.

Further as NCTC, we are working closely with private sector security firms to insert protective security and terrorism awareness into their training and supervision of guards. These companies are often on the frontline of these assets. NCTC and Private Security Sector Alliance have worked on curriculum development and delivery.

It is my expectation that the quality of work which has been invested in this document will be of benefit to the users in realigning their strategic and critical thinking capabilities in navigating through the counter /prevention of violent extremism.

One last point I want to bring to your attention is the difference between Violent Extremist and Violent Criminal. While the Violent Criminal will be at pains to cover their tracks after committing a crime, the Violent Extremist demands to be celebrated because he sees himself as a hero and are proud of their acts.



Joseph O. Opondo OGW, JP, BENEMERENTI

Director

National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) Kenya

ACKNOWLEDGMENT



This report further rubber stamps the team spirit that manifests at LRF and mentorship which defines the role played by the Board of Trustees in strengthening the capacity of the secretariat.

Given the grave realities associated with violent extremism and the fact that the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism is close to five years old; Legal Resources Foundation Trust (LRF) and partners found it prudent to take stock of the changes that have been experienced in the CVE continuum, along side the objectives of the National strategy with a view to draw informed interventions that speak to the now amorphous shape and form of violent extremism.

We are therefore thankful to the individuals and institutions who not only dedicated their time, but shared input, experiences, expertise and live stories which required energy, emotional compromise which would have otherwise remained unspoken.

Mr. Eddie Kaddebe, we cannot thank you enough. Your leadership, dedication in collecting and collating data that forms this report cannot be gainsaid. Your wisdom, intellect, networks as well as experience was the corner stone on which this study is predicated. For such a sensitive and emotive topic, you remain a force to be reckoned with.

We take pride of the LRF team represented by Mr. Eric Mukoya, Mr. Job Mwaura, and Mr. Paul Kauku. Your resilience, patience and dedication in conceptualizing, editing and quality control only affirms the passion that you radiate towards realizing a world free from all forms of violence. This report further rubber stamps the team spirit that manifests at LRF and mentorship which defines the role played by the Board of Trustees in strengthening the capacity of the secretariat.

We remain indebted to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) for the technical and financial support throughout the entire process.



Agnes Rogo,
Programs Manager, Legal Resources Foundation Trust

BACKGROUND



Kenya continues to bear the brunt of terrorism both on account of direct loss attributed to terrorist activities as well as economic loss that is a direct consequence of the former. Between 2007 and 2018, for instance, Kenya lost 1272 lives due to terrorist attacks . With each attack, many countries who trade with Kenya and whose citizens' frequent Kenya avoid traveling to Kenya and it is common to see Western governments issue travel advisories, advising against travel to Kenya from time to time. The impact of this reverberates across the Kenyan economic scene more so in the tourism industry. This is with tourism being a major source of foreign exchange , tax revenues and employment. The 2015 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) Report estimates an increase in GTI score for Kenya of about 0.362 to reach 6.66 in their zero to ten score index during the period 2013/14 . It can be argued that the purpose of these attacks is to cripple the economy by making Kenya a hostile environment for foreign direct investment (FDI) and tourist visits.

Over time Kenya has adopted various strategies and approaches specifically to counter the threat of terrorism. These have adopted both soft power and hard power. The hard power approach has seen Kenya respond to the threat through the deployment of the Kenya Defence Forces to fight terrorists in Somalia.

On October 16, 2011, two battalions of the Kenyan army, numbering 2,400 troops, crossed the border into southern Somalia. While the ostensible catalyst for the intervention was a spate of high-profile cross-border kidnappings and murders by freelance Somali criminals, a longer-term set of ambitions and objectives underlay the operation, which, according to some analysts, was contemplated by elements of the Kenyan military as early as 2009. Whether the operation can ultimately succeed in furthering Kenya's short- and longer-term objectives is uncertain. The deployment (as with most interventions in Somalia) may have unanticipated costs, complications, and consequences both within Kenya and the broader region that undermine short-term gains and weaken domestic and regional support . The benefits and/or gains made through hard power do not form the subject of this study but are nonetheless critical in understanding Kenya's response. It is the soft power response to terrorism that begets this study.



Soft power responses to terrorism are designed to win the hearts and minds of both radicalizing and radicalized individuals through the use of non-coercive methods . They include counter radicalization, de-radicalization and countering violent extremism. Soft power is geared towards preventing radicalization to violence and the crime of terrorism. It's disruptive in nature as it counters narratives, critically analyses terrorist propaganda, provides positive messages from credible sources and educates user base to build their resilience to risks of radicalization online.

The United Nations Security Council increasingly emphasises the need for a comprehensive approach to countering the spread of terrorism and violent extremism. One aspect of such an approach has come to be known as countering violent extremism (CVE). In its resolution 2178 (2014) , on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), the Council underscores that CVE is an “essential element” in addressing the threat to international peace and security posed by FTFs. The Council encourages Member States to engage with relevant local communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to counter the violent extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts. States are also called upon to address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, including by empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders, and all other concerned groups of civil society, and promoting social inclusion and cohesion .

In satisfaction of its obligations under Resolution 2178, Kenya, as a state party, developed a National Strategy to Counter Violent extremism in 2016. Its view was to rally all sectors of Kenyan social, religious and economic life to emphatically and continuously reject violent extremist ideologies in order to shrink the pool of individuals whom extremist groups seek to radicalize and recruit. However, radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups continues to subsist in Kenya and there have been terrorist attacks in Kenya since, 2016.

It is almost five years since Kenya developed the National strategy to Counter Violent Extremism. It is critical to find out whether the strategy has met its expectations and gauge to what extent this is so should the answer be in the affirmative.

SCOPE

Based on the foregoing background information, this study sought to understand what the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism has been able to achieve. Whether there is compliance with the strategy culminating to a change in the hearts and minds of those who it targets? Whether there have been any milestones achieved and shortfalls suffered in its implementation? Whether the strategy has adopted to the evolving nature of VE? Ultimately the study will demonstrate whether the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism has responded to both the initial threat at its inception as well as the current threat in light of the changed environment in which we live in.

This appraisal is predicated more on: (a) understanding whether the strategy is known and its deliverables within the knowledge of the actors in the arena of CVE as well as the general population; (b) Examining the role and responses of the agencies mandated with realization of its objectives; and, (c) Examine the strategy's adaptability to the evolving nature of violent extremism. Against this background, this appraisal has provided recommendations informing future actions by actors and stakeholders in the CVE sector.

The National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism calls for the forty-seven (47) counties of Kenya to enact County Action Plans to counter violent extremism with a view to breathe life to the national strategy at the county level. As such, this appraisal has examined whether and to what extent this has been achieved.

Critically, this appraisal has provided solutions and/or recommendations towards the prevention of violent extremism in Kenya.

The outcome of this report should not be simply to do a status report of the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism after five years, but specifically:

- a) Rally Kenyans of all walks of life to emphatically and continuously reject violent ideologies; and,
- b) in the short term, assess the impact of the strategy with the seemingly amorphous violent extremism landscape.

Continuous engagement with government, non-government organisations, human rights defenders, members of the clergy and social workers will greatly aid enhance a sense of ownership, legitimacy, and pride in defending the country from the ills germane of violent extremism

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LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review examines the body of works that exists in the field of CVE. It provides an assessment of what various authors perceive CVE to be, the implementation of the same and the challenges associated with it. Critically it also addresses what the process of measuring the success or otherwise of CVE plans.

Corman identifies the need to differentiate between soft and hard power and approach CVE from a soft power perspective. He argues that we must also seek new channels of communication that depart from traditional approaches and venues for public speeches and forums. We must learn to leverage all we know about new media, viral marketing, gaming, virtual reality and cultural diplomacy to once again offer hope to a troubled world and practical solutions to everyday problems of food, shelter safety and security in the world's troubled neighbourhoods. He further argues that the "the war of ideas" is a communication struggle. It cannot be won militarily on the battlefield but must be won rhetorically and narratively in the hearts and in the minds of those on all sides of this ideological front. Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent extremism must not only match this argument but be measured against the same. Kenya's strategy has been in force since 2016, it should now respond to the questions posed; how is it leveraging to new media, viral marketing, cultural diplomacy, crypto currency et al to realize the objective of CVE?

Koehler agrees with Corman and expands the discourse further. He states that after the September 11 attacks in the USA and subsequent attacks, Western and non-western states alike recognized the need for alternatives to repression and prosecution as a means of fighting terrorism, violent radicalization and extremism on their own turf, realizing that it would be impossible to 'bomb' and 'arrest' one's way out of the terrorist threat. Koehler, nonetheless, acknowledges that numerous attacks have followed 9/11 for example Madrid (March 2004), Amsterdam (March 2004), London (July 2005), Stockholm (December 2010) and Paris (January and November 2015 as well as various foiled plots which had a large number of perpetrators being born and raised in the countries they attacked. They had obviously been radicalised at home. As a consequence, Western governments tried to introduce various CVE strategies designed to combat home grown radicalization by looking at experiences in their own social and work environments and civil societies, but also drawing on promising and innovative approaches. Kenya's NSCVE could not be posed at a better crossroads if recent activity forms a measure.

Kenyans have perpetrated violent extremist attacks inside Kenya and there are examples; Kenyan national Elgiva Bwire Oliacha, for example, carried out an al-Shabaab grenade attack in Nairobi in 2011 that wounded over two dozen people. Oliacha pled guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment, though his sentence was later reduced to 15 years. In April 23, 2014, Kenyan national Abdul Hajira attacked a Nairobi police station with a car bomb, killing two police officers—though media outlets have not linked Hajira to any specific group. In August 2016, a police raid targeting a former police officer who had deserted the force recovered three AK-47 rifles and 178 rounds of ammunition. The suspect was reported to have been planning an attack on an elite police force and was believed to have been radicalized by al-Shabaab. The terrorists who attacked the Dusit D2 hotel in Nairobi on 15th January, 2019 were radicalised in Kenya and led by a Kenyan – Ali Salim Gichunge. Not only so, but he came from a geographical region within Kenya that is not traditionally associated with radicalization going by the common narrative of state neglect and disenfranchisement as had been common in the past. Prior to that, the same attackers had an attempt foiled in Merti, Isiolo where a vehicle carrying a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) was intercepted by security agencies en route to Nairobi. Does the 2016 NSCVE address the current realities and to what extent? Is it too focused on external radicalization as to ignore internally radicalised individuals? This appraisal must give responses to these questions.

Indeed the Kenya extremism and Counter extremism Report (2015) highlights a critical departure from the previous 'known'. It states that Kenyan youths face economic, religious, and social coercion to convince them that they have no alternative to joining extremist organizations, Lambert Mbela, a Christian pastor in Mombasa, told Religion News Service. According to Mbela, some youth convert to Islam for the promise of economic benefits or even just food. A June 2018 report by PeaceTech Lab report found that increased economic opportunity was one of the primary reasons for conversion to Islam among the region's Christians. The report noted that east African Christians who convert to Islam are often more at risk of radicalization due to social isolation. PeaceTech Lab researchers focused on the area of Mombasa and found that the families and friends of Christian converts to Islam tend to break their ties, increasing the converts' isolation and susceptibility to recruitment. Radicalization and violent extremism have been commercialised in Kenya. The NSCVE, in design and implementation must respond to this.

As early back as 2009, the conversation on the design of strategies to counter violent extremism was alive in the minds of actors within the field, more so in consideration of the fact that the strategies targeted Muslim communities, which very act could be a driver to further radicalization. Writing about it in 2009, Thomas posits that the 7/7 London suicide bombings of July 2005 and numerous subsequent Islamist terror plots have highlighted the reality of an 'internal' threat to Britain. One governmental response has been the 'Preventing Violent Extremism' (PVE) programme. Whilst the educational aspect of its focus on Muslim young people is to be welcomed, there are serious concerns as to whether PVE policy, as currently designed, is falling between two stools. To date, the programme focuses exclusively on Muslim communities in flat contradiction to the integration policy priority of community cohesion, so risking further defensiveness from Muslim communities and resentment from white working class communities. Whilst ignoring the right-wing extremism growing in some of those white communities, PVE work with young people is actually failing to engage openly and robustly with the real political issues driving Muslim anger and minority extremist support. The confidence, understanding and skills of educational practitioners are vital here. A delicate balance must not only be sought but achieved by Kenya's NSCVE. It must not be seen to be too far left as to be counterproductive in breeding new justification for radicalization through perceptions of targeting. Thomas further calls into perspective a critical component of any education based CVE activity and that is the confidence, understanding and skills of educational practitioners. Post 2016, it is imperative to gauge if and how this has been achieved and is measured within Kenya's NSCVE.

On the opposite end of this spectrum is the approach taken by the United States of America. Mc Cann and Watts offer their assessment of the US strategy for CVE. They state that the task of reducing terrorist group supporters is often left to law enforcement and the military because people view non-incarcerated supporters of all stripes as irredeemable. They further contend that unless supporters are incarcerated, tracking success in reducing their numbers is more difficult than tracking success in reducing sympathy. This approach is suggestive of the use of hard power to counter the threat posed by terrorism. Kenya's NSCVE is partly in agreement with this. It calls for the creation of offences even as it pursues a CVE agenda and the attendant prosecution for the same. The NSCVE is in a sense a hybrid of a soft power 'hearts and minds' approach as well as a hard power law enforcement and military approach as seen in "Operation Linda Nchi". The criminalisation of conduct has been achieved through the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the use of other legislation as well as administrative measures that are meant not only to punish those involved but also to offer deterrence to those who might want to be involved in acts of terrorism.

In September 2018, the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS) and the Institute of Development Studies jointly launched the Countering Violent Extremism Research Hub, an online library to support CVE research. The government-funded resource tracks extremist incidents in Kenya and details active CVE programming. The Centre reports that in the same year, Kenyan

security experts noted that Kenya's military strategy (Linda Nchi) had led to a general decrease in al-Shabaab's violent activities but there had been a simultaneous increase in online radicalization. This is an indication of the fluidity and the dynamism of radicalization as well as the push and pull factors that drive people towards radicalization. Kenya's NSCVE must be tested to see if it responds to this dynamism and ever changing world.

The Commonwealth has equally proposed an adoption of technology amidst and a constantly shifting approach to address the dynamism of the threat. In its toolkit to counter violent extremism an argument is presented therein that extremists and violent extremists have always sought to use compelling messages and narratives as a means of attracting followers to their cause. In the modern age it follows that the internet and social media represent a significant and easy to use medium to inspire, radicalise and recruit young people. It is apparent that if Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is to be effective, there must be greater focus and resources made available to the development of effective counter narratives, both online and offline. It must be noted that Counter Narrative Programmes are time and resource intensive and require committed action.

The Commonwealth tool kit further makes critical observations of the challenges to be surmounted by vulnerable individuals in their social environment in the implementation of any CVE measures. These are identified as detecting those who are at risk of radicalization; being able to get into contact with them and supporting them and their families in a change of direction and supporting both the individual as well as their family during the disengagement process. These observations are true for Kenya as well and the success or failure of any initiatives from the NSCVE are to be cognisant of the same.

Public opinion is difficult to gauge in Kenya given the lack of public polling. Nonetheless, some basic trends can be discerned about how Kenyans assess the threats arising from Islamist violence. Compared to other African nations, Kenya is greatly concerned about the dangers posed by Islamic extremism. A survey released by Aga Khan University's East African Institute in January 2016 suggests that the majority of Kenyan youth would do "anything to generate money and wealth regardless of its legality as long as they are not caught." This is particularly worrisome as unemployment is one of the main factors luring Kenyan youth to join al-Shabaab. A State of National Security Annual Report to Parliament in 2016 found the terror group capitalizes on Kenya's youth unemployment and feelings of marginalization to recruit.

In a Pew Research Center survey published in March 2013, approximately 55 percent of Kenyans believe that terrorism constitutes a major threat to the country. According to data from 2014, 66 percent of Kenyans support Kenyan military presence against al-Shabaab in Somalia. When asked to evaluate their government's performance in fighting terrorism, however, 51 percent of those surveyed believed their government was handling it "Very/Fairly badly."

According to press reporting in June 2017, there were signs of increased public frustration with al-Shabaab's continued ability to mount deadly attacks in Kenya. After a wave of attacks on security forces and civilians in northeastern Somalia between mid-May and early June 2017, five local officials in Garissa County threatened to arm civilians and blamed the national government for failing to protect them. A local member of parliament, Barre Shill, called on the national government to arm "the community" to defend itself against al-Shabaab because "we are not being protected." Teachers and health workers who failed to report to work due to security fears added to the officials' concerns.

Is Kenya's NSCVE a good strategy? Does it conform to global expectations of what a good strategy should be or contain? The Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) provides a baseline for this. It states that while national strategies will reflect the context and culture of each country, the following guidelines should be considered in their development:

- Establish clear roles and responsibilities of different government ministries, departments,

agencies and offices with respect to CVE national strategy development and implementation—including intra-government coordination and communications mechanisms;

- Clarify roles and responsibilities between central, regional and local government and between government and non-government organizations, civil society organizations, communities and private sector when it comes to CVE;
- Include mechanisms that allow different actors to hold each other accountable;
- Consider the potential for unintended consequences and assess the risk for approaches that could exacerbate violent extremism or vulnerability to violent extremist messaging, and identify constructive means of addressing grievances (real or perceived); and
- Promote and foster ownership for non-governmental actors including civil society and the private sector to engage on CVE.

It further makes provision for good practices and principles in domestic CVE strategies. These include:

1. A national CVE strategy that is comprehensive and integrated into a wider counterterrorism strategy framework should include all relevant government (both national and sub-national) and non-government actors to address the complex and transnational challenges posed by contemporary violent extremist groups. On the governmental side, stakeholders often include traditional security policymakers as well as policymakers from other sectors such as education, social work (including women and family support), human rights, youth and sport, health and/or emergency services, and local officials who can speak to the sub-national context. These stakeholders may also include civil society voices that are often underrepresented such as women and youth.

2. An agreed mechanism and platform for flexible and responsive coordination and communication is critical to addressing what may be a rapidly evolving challenge. Communications between relevant stakeholders at the local, national and international levels will be key, including also frontline CVE implementers and practitioners, to ensure consistency in strategy delivery and messaging.

3. An effective dissemination plan for the CVE strategy must ensure consultation and engagement with critical stakeholders including local governments, communities and partners.

4. It is important to focus CVE national strategies and prioritize based on a well-informed threat analysis of identified drivers, the nature and level of the threat as well as available resources

5. Trust-building and respect between governments and communities is crucial to developing a comprehensive national CVE strategy and successful programming at the grassroots level.

6. National strategies may be sector-specific and include non-traditional stakeholders in counterterrorism such as the private sector, human rights NGOs, grassroots organizations, religious leaders etc.

7. It is important to ensure that national strategies are developed with due consideration of regional and international strategies that aim to prevent and counter violent extremism. Effective implementation of any CVE strategy will therefore need to take into account local needs, perspectives, and priorities and involve the active participation of key sub-regional stakeholders, including national governments, sub-regional bodies, and civil society.

8. National CVE strategies should ensure they are also in alignment with other national action plans (NAPs) and strategies that are related in terms of common objectives or 4 stakeholders

9. When creating and implementing a national CVE strategy, it is important that governments adhere to their international law, including international human rights, refugees, and humanitarian law obligations, as underscored by the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy.

As a final guide the GCTF proposes that a comprehensive CVE strategy should contain the following points:

1. National CVE strategies may consider grievances that might contribute to radicalization and recruitment, including (but not limited to) prolonged unresolved conflicts, weak rule of law, violations of human rights, (real or perceived), ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization, and/or weak good governance.

2. National CVE strategies may include raising early identification or warning, and response capacities of practitioners and frontline workers. Examples of this include training frontline workers (educators, police officers, prison officers, and youth workers) on processes of radicalization and recruitment; providing opportunities for communities to engage directly with governments; and creating support hotlines, other communication mechanisms or information systems for communities to use and access.

3. National CVE strategies may include broader activities to build community resilience, including (but not limited to) formal and informal education programs; sports, arts and cultural programs; technical and vocational skills development; municipal or neighbourhood associations and meetings; after-school and family-oriented programs. If focused, such interventions can contribute to promoting pluralism, tolerance, critical thinking, which can challenge and counter violent extremist messages.

4. National CVE strategies may include individualized interventions such as direct efforts to prevent an individual from radicalization/recruitment, de-radicalization, disengagement and reintegration programs for those individuals already radicalized and prosecuted (prisoners), as well as disengagement and rehabilitation programs for individuals re-entering society.

5. National CVE strategies may include strategic communications efforts, including those to counter and reject misinformation, dispute messages of violent extremists, reinforce and communicate national governments' messages, promote alternative, positive messages and address illegal media content. Strategic communications in this regard may also include amplifying local community voices and leaders that counter the message of violent extremism, but may not represent the government officially or unofficially. It is also important to build the resilience of young people to violent extremist messages in social media, for instance through the educational system and in other settings.

6. National CVE strategies may also consider how CVE efforts connect with other counter-terrorism measures, including (but not limited to) protection against attacks through border control and/or surveillance and intelligence; crisis management and follow up in case of an attack; and legislation outlining terrorist crimes and prosecution strategies.

This appraisal provides an assessment of Kenya's NSCVE against these guidelines by seeking to answer these questions: to what extent has the NSCVE incorporated these guidelines; how effective have they been and are they static or adaptive to the ever-changing arena of CVE.

**THE LEGAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UNDERPINNING CVE
IN KENYA**



NATIONAL

The National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (2016)

The National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism came into force in 2016. It provides a threat analysis with regard to terrorism and identifies both individuals and groups as threats. The strategy underscores the fact that terrorism is a threat to democracy and in indicating its strategic objectives correlates this with the attainment of democracy and a desire to achieve inclusivity.

The NSCVE identifies 6 broad drivers of radicalization; Ideological, Socio-economic, political, Personal, Global/Geo-political and Technological drivers. It rallies state and non-state actors to mainstream their responses to the threat in a manner that addresses these drivers.

Critically, the NSCVE identifies where radicalization is happening in Kenya and points out seven hotspots. These are listed as educational institutions; religious institutions; internet and mass media; remand centres and prisons; refugee camps; training camps both locally and abroad and it also appreciates neighbourhood dynamics as a contributing factor to where radicalization is happening.

The NSCVE identifies 3 levels of prevention of radicalization as being general, specific and individual oriented and provides for a whole of government approach. It calls for a collaborative effort between actors in both the public and private sector taking into consideration the devolved structure of Kenya's governance. Counties are expected to develop County Action Plans that are derived from the NSCVE. In so doing it identifies 9 cross cutting work pillars that frame its activities and deliverables. These are: Psychological, Educational, Political, Security, Faith Based and Ideological, Training and Capacity Building, Arts and Culture, Legal and Policy AND Media and Online pillars.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA)

POTA is the key statute in Kenya that criminalises terrorism and related activities. It is worthy to note that POTA, in its preamble describes itself as 'An Act of Parliament to provide measures for the detection and prevention of terrorist activities; to amend the Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Act and the Extradition (Contiguous and Foreign Countries) Act; and for connected purposes'. It is therefore meant to factor in the preventive effort and criminalise actions and actors deemed to be in support of terrorists. This is in tandem with both the NSCVE as well as Kenya's obligations under various international instruments as contained in subsequent sections of this report.

Amongst the highlights of POTA is that it defines what a terrorist act is, what a terrorist group is, what terrorist property is and the creation of various offences including offering support for the commission of terrorist activities (S.4 to S.30). Amongst the offences created is the offence of radicalization which is a critical expectation of the Legal and Policy pillar of the NSCVE. POTA further makes provision for administrative action against specified entities to curb financial flows to terrorists.

Furthermore, POTA provides for ancillary powers that agencies may invoke in realizing its objectives. One of the most important of these is the power granted to courts to order for pre-charge detention as investigations continue. It also legalises wiretaps and makes such information admissible in courts of law.

The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) is also established by POTA. NCTC is responsible for the co-ordination of national counter-terrorism efforts in order to detect, deter and disrupt terrorism acts. This includes, inter alia, to develop strategies such as counter and de-radicalization. Towards this end, the NCTC has developed the NSCVE as well as County Action Plans.

POTA also establishes a Compensation of Victims of Terrorism Fund and makes provision on what moneys go into the fund.

POTA also has established the Prevention of Terrorism (Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Suppression of Terrorism) Regulations, 2013.

The Security Laws Amendment Act (SLAA)

The SLAA was an omnibus Act that amended several statutes. With regard to terrorism SLAA amended and/or introduced various offences so as to make them more responsive to the threat posed by terrorism and in keeping up with the preamble and intention of POTA i.e. to prevent terrorist activity. SLAA also operationalized the NCTC.

The Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA)

POCA was enacted for the prevention and punishment of organized crime; to provide for the recovery of proceeds of organized criminal group activities and for connected purposes. It often provides a fallback in relation to terrorist activity where the ingredients of a POTA offence have not been met. Terrorism is, nonetheless, considered as organized crime and therefore POCA is applicable as well.

Organized criminal activity is defined in S.3 of POCA where 15 possible categories of organized criminal activity are outlined. Some are contained in POTA, the difference here being that they are broad based and not confined to terrorism. Should investigations fail to establish a link to terrorism, then one can be charged for the applicable organized criminal activity.

The Firearms Act

Another substitute for POTA, the Firearms Act was enacted for regulating, licensing and controlling the manufacture, importation, exportation, transportation, sale, repair, storage, possession and use of firearms, ammunition, airguns and destructive devices and for connected purposes.

The Explosives Act

The Explosives Act provides the law that relates to the manufacture, storage, sale, transport, importation, exportation and use of explosives. Many times it provides an alternative charge when terrorism charges are preferred.

The Basic Education Act

The Basic Education Act seeks to promote and regulate free and compulsory basic education; to provide for accreditation, registration, governance and management of institutions of basic education; to provide for the establishment of the National Education Board, the Education Standards and Quality Assurance Commission, and the County Education Board and for connected purposes.

The Act is critical as it provides several definitions, key among them being:

- “Duksi” means Islamic elementary institution that offers Quranic education and other related subjects
- “Madrassa” means the structural Muslim educational institutions or schools that offer Islamic and other subjects and are laddered from primary to secondary
- “Mobile school” means a formal flexible institution that allows for mobility of pupils and teachers and is specifically designed to suit the needs of migrant communities
- “Non-formal education” means any organized educational activity taking place outside the framework of the formal education system and targets specific groups/categories of persons

with life skills, values and attitudes for personal and community development

- “out-of-school youth” means all persons who have attained the age of eighteen years but have not attained thirty five years and who are not engaged in learning in the formal education system

The Act states that the provision of basic education shall be based 21 guiding principles . Whilst all are important, the most critical one in relation to CVE has to be principle (i) which calls for the promotion of peace, integration, cohesion, tolerance, and inclusion as an objective in the provision of basic education. This is a key component of the NSCVE. By providing for various classification and levels of basic education, the Act acts as a window for the NCTC and actors within the CVE arena to identify entry points comparative to the threat, develop programmes that are tailor made for various age brackets and systems and deliberately look for a cohesive environment for all learners.

The Non-governmental Organizations Coordination Act

This is an Act of Parliament to make provision for the registration and co-ordination of Non-Governmental Organizations in Kenya and for connected purposes.

The Persons Deprived of Liberty Act (PDLA)

The PDLA gives effect to Articles 29 (f) and 51 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. It is of significant importance to law enforcement officers, judicial officers as well as prosecutors as violations of the rights contained therein can contribute to the state excesses narrative that drives people to radicalization.

The Prisons Act

The Prisons Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to prisons; to provide for youth corrective training centres, extra mural penal employment; to provide for the organisation, discipline, powers and duties of prison officers; and for matters incidental thereto and connected therewith.

Considering the fact that the NSCVE identifies prisons as a hot spot for radicalization, any successful CVE programme must bring into focus the institutional and personnel capabilities of Kenyan prisons. This is particularly in relation to segregation as between remandees and convicts of terrorism and related offences; remandees/convicts of terrorism and related offences and the rest of the prison population; minors and adults as well as females and males.

Any likelihood of prison warders themselves must be mitigated against and insulated against the harsh realities of corruption in Kenyan prisons.

The County Governments Act (CGA)

The CGA is particularly important for 3 reasons:

- Provides the legal mandate for counties to develop County Action Plans under the NSCVE
- Counties are able to identify their focal areas in relation to CVE through public participation
- Counties are able to legislate and provide funding for CVE activities within each respective county.

REGIONAL


The IGAD Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

This regional strategy calls upon IGAD member states to act in concert in imposing measures and enacting legislation that would apply across member states' and Tanzania. It calls upon members to find local solutions to the challenges of radicalization.

IGAD has directed its efforts to enhancing the soft power capabilities, coordination and partnerships to prevent and counter violent extremism. This is the agenda driving the Regional Strategy. The strategy will deepen member states' understanding of the drivers of violent extremism and concrete measures to diminish the appeal of radical ideologies and messages that are pulling people to violence. The strategy will also help states in the region to coordinate their response internally within government and with other non-state stakeholders while expanding space for cooperation across the region and to forge meaningful international partnerships to support efforts aimed at eroding the appeal of extremists.

The strategy admits the lack of uniformity in defining what CVE is and therefore gives it a definition by stating that first, it is purely an ideology that rejects the principles and values that underpin a peaceful orderly and non-violent society, instead espousing violence, terror and coercion as a pathway to change and to realizing specific beliefs and vision of society.

Second, it acknowledges that preventing and countering violent extremism is primarily a strategy that highlights non-coercive approaches designed to address the drivers or root causes of extremism in ord.



INTERNATIONAL

There are several international instruments that address terrorism and violent extremism. These are:

1. The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft
2. The 1970 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
3. The 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
4. The 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation
5. The 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons
6. The 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
7. The 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (and the 2005 amendments thereto)
8. The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (and the attendant 1988 and 2005 Protocols on Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf)
9. The 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection
10. The 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
11. The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

United Nations Declarations

1. Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 1994
2. Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 1996
3. The United Nations Global Counter

Terrorism Strategy, 2006

Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council

1. Resolution 1373 (2001) – Establishment of Counter Terrorism Committee
2. Resolution 1377 (2001) – Ministerial declaration on the global effort to combat terrorism
3. Resolution 1452 (2002) – Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
4. Resolution 1455 (2003) – Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
5. Resolution 1456 (2003) – Declaration of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs on the issue of combating terrorism
6. Resolution 1526 (2004) – Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
7. Resolution 1535 (2004) – Establishment of the Executive Directorate Counter Terrorism Committee

8. Resolution 1566 (2004) – Establishment of a working group to consider measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities other than those designated by the Al-Qaida Taliban Sanctions Committee
9. Resolution 1617 (2005) – Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
10. Resolution 1624 (2005) – Prohibition of incitement to commit terrorist acts
11. Resolution 1735 (2006) – Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

These instruments provide statutory and procedural obligations on Kenya as a state party. Many of our municipal statutes are founded on international treaty obligations. Further, Kenya reports on its status from time to time and this provides a measure of accountability to the international community.

The Research Methodology

A three-pronged approach was adopted which included the distribution of a questionnaire, interviews with key resource persons and conversations with members of the community. To protect the credibility of the process and in consideration of the respondents' safety, the researcher left out any identifier for the respondents unless with prior consent.

The Questionnaire was distributed to members of the ODP, Civil Society, ATPU and the Public following leads. While 20 copies were sent to each of these four groupings, the response was about 50%. The researcher also engaged in focal key informant interviews with members of the clergy, the education sector, Kenya Prison Service and the NCTC. The findings are presented hereunder.

Questionnaire

This was divided into 3 parts:-

Part I comprising 9 questions inquired about knowledge and awareness of the NSCVE

Part II comprising 12 questions looked at the 9 priority areas of the NSCVE

Part III comprising 4 questions looked at the implementation of the NSCVE at county level.




Figure 1: Awareness of Violent Extremism

Part I

Question 1 sought to find out if the respondents knew what violent extremism is. Out of 40 respondents, 10 did not know while 30 knew what VE is.

Majority of the yes response came from individuals who interacted with the CVE field as actors in the fields. The No's were civilians who lived in the focal areas of the study and were affected by CVE directly through the loss of people close to them either through joining the terrorism arena or perceived forced disappearance.

Unsurprisingly, the employed respondents indicated that they knew about VE through their line of work, in response to Question 2. Few indicated that they knew about it from the media with almost none indicating that they found out from the internet.

Asked in Question 3 whether they knew if Kenya had a National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism, the response was similar to that in Question 1 with the actors in the arena indicating familiarity while the civilian population remained largely unaware.

The response to Question 4 which sought to find out how they became aware of the NSCVE followed a similar trend to Question 2 with most getting to know about it through their employer and the GoK MDA's. None of the respondents indicated that they had become aware of the NSCVE through the internet.

On who implements the NSCVE, the lines were equally clear between the arena actors and the civilians. Those in the field stated that it is the NCTC while the civilian population had no response.

All the respondents except one officer from the ATPU demonstrated that they did not know that at the time of the research all of 47 counties had County Action Plans. The respondents know that some counties had CAPs but not all of them as stated.

Part II

Question 10 sought to find out how successful the NSCVE had been in fostering nationhood and inculcating a rejection of extremist ideologies. The response was as




Figure 2: Graphical representation of the success of Priority 1 of the NSCVE

Question 11 sought to find out whether the NSCVE had succeeded in promoting patriotism in Kenya. To which the respondents stated;



Figure 3: Graphical representation of the success of Priority 2 of the NSCVE

The NSCVE seeks to enhance the GoK’s support to local communities that are targeted by violent extremists by addressing communal grievances. In Question 12 the questionnaire sought to find out if this had been achieved. The respondents responded as follows:




Figure 4: How the NSCVE has supported local communities by addressing communal grievances

In its priority 4, the NSCVE seeks to develop early warning and early intervention measures. Question 13 of the questionnaire asks whether this objective has been met. The response to this question was almost a unanimous 'NO'. save for 3 respondents from the ATPU who answered 'YES' the rest of the respondents indicated that they were not aware of any early warning and intervention measures.

Priority 5 of the NSCVE speaks of rehabilitation and reintegration support for individuals who disengage from violent extremism through a community-based approach. The response to question 14 of the questionnaire that related to priority 5 was as follows, out of 10 respondents from each category: -




Figure 5: Opinion as to the success of rehabilitation and reintegration support

The respondents indicated, as a follow up to this question, that they were largely unaware, not necessarily because the efforts were not there, but that the information on this priority area was not of a nature that you would come across easily due to the stigma attached to individuals who had joined the arena and returned. It is not an area of open conversation.

Priority 6 of the NSCVE focuses on the development of expertise in the non-coercive approaches to CVE in the Government of Kenya, particularly in the security services. A series of 3 questions (15, 16 and 17) were posed in the questionnaire; seeking a general response from the respondents at Question 15 and more detail from security sector actors (ATPU) in the subsequent 2 questions.

The response to these set of questions from the ATPU corroborated with the information from the NCTC respondent to the extent that NCTC has conducted sufficient training over time in relation to non-coercive approaches. Be that as it was, there was a concern, however, that it didn't factor in other state agencies outside of law enforcement and/or who came into direct contact with radicalised individuals such as prosecutors and judicial officers. It was perceived as a security oriented objective. Unsurprisingly the general public were not aware of these approaches as being an outcome of the NSCVE but stated that something 'must be working' since there were fewer attacks recently compared to 2014 or thereabouts. The ODPP, Civil Society and ATPU respondents collectively agreed that there was some slight improvement in the development of expertise on the use of non-coercive approaches.

Question 18 of the questionnaire aimed at responding to priority 7 of the NSCVE which specifically looks at law enforcement to deter and prosecute radicalising individuals and institutions. The results of the study from the respondents was almost unanimous that this had been achieved. However, there was a concern from the ODPP prosecutors and one officer from the ATPU who stated that while the POTA created an offence of radicalization, it was a difficult offence to prove in court from an evidentiary perspective and so far it has been difficult to secure a conviction. This was primarily because radicalization is a state of mind and it was difficult to gather evidence to prove this. Conversely it is easier to prove what the radicalized individual did post radicalization which may constitute a different offence under the Act.

Priority 8 of the NSCVE looks at research and seeks to have Kenya's CVE actors have the benefit of a dynamic, action ready and research informed understanding of the evolution of violent extremist ideologies, organisational models and radicalization methodologies. Out of 40 respondents 36 stated that they did not know whether this had been achieved and only 4 from the ATPU gave a different answer to this.




Figure 6: Illustration of the level of achievement of Priority 8 of the NSCVE

The questionnaire further sought to find out, as the last of the NSCVE's 9 priority areas, whether the respondents were aware of any clear multi-sectorial pathways and guidelines to effectively and productively engage in CVE. The findings were as follows:-




Figure 7: Knowledge on Priority 9 on clear pathways and guidelines to effectively and productively engage in CVE

Part III

This section of the questionnaire tested the implementation of the NSCVE at county level through the County Action Plans.

Question 23 in the questionnaire sought to find out what needed to be done at county level so as to implement the priority areas of the NSCVE. The varied responses from the respondents are summarised as such; creation of awareness of both the NSCVE and the CAP, sensitization on both the NSCVE and CAP and a focus on youth in any CVE efforts.

Question 24 of the questionnaire sought to answer the research question; since 2016 did the respondents think the NSCVE had been successful or not? This is what the respondents said:-




Figure 8: Respondents' view on whether or not the NSCVE had been successful 4 years later

The Kenya Prison Service

As one of the areas specifically identified in the NSCVE as one where radicalization was taken place. This research endeavoured to find out the impact of the NSCVE on the Kenya Prison Service. From a telephone interview with an officer from the Service, the research sought to answer three questions;

1. How the KPS had aligned itself to meet the objectives of the NSCVE?
2. What the KPS has done to counter the threat of radicalization not just of inmates but potentially warders?
3. How the officer would rate the success of the NSCVE post 2016?

The research was able to establish that through the NCTC, staff at the prison facilities have been receiving training on CVE, how to spot and mitigate the risk as well as deter further radicalization of inmates. They have adopted and use RADAR which is a protocol that is designed to systematically document all aspects of a person and his/her environment.

KPS has also deliberately segregated both remandees as well as convicts facing and having being convicted of terrorism related offences respectively. While the efficacy of this action is debatable, it has worked to minimise interactions with other inmates subsequently impacting on reduced levels of radicalization.

Challenges abound, nonetheless to the extent that the programmes in place that seek to de-radicalize are not tailor made to counter distinguish between remandees and convicts especially since for remandees a determination of their guilt or innocence is yet to be made by the courts. Further, the duration of their trial is difficult to pre-determine and tailor a program that is capable of execution within the same time so as to have predictability, uniformity and a reasonable expectation of success. There also is a potential minefield where children who may come in conflict with law are concerned should they be charged with POTA offences; where will the children be housed and under what conditions so as not to infringe on their rights? These are capacity challenges that the KPS is not adequately prepared to handle more so considering the bulk of CT remandees are currently either at Kamiti or Shimo la Tewa maximum security prisons.

With regard to the third arm of the interview questions, the officer could not gauge the success or otherwise of the NSCVE primarily because there really isn't any tool to do so. Simply put the NSCVE does call for monitoring and evaluation but does not say how.

The Education Sector

There have been deliberate attempts to mainstream religious studies into formal education in Kenya. This is ever so clear looking at the provisions of the Basic Education Act, elucidated hereinbefore. However, the content taught in religious based classes; both Christian and Muslim remains for the most part subjective, particularly for Islamic based studies. There is no uniformity and it remains unclear whether the content is capable of regulation or uniformity.

There also are socio-economic factors that continue to be drivers of radicalization even within communities with an improved access to education. Mainstreaming religious education by itself is not the proverbial magic wand and for the NSCVE to fully realize its objectives, both a whole of government and a whole of sector approach must be deployed concomitantly.

The NSCVE specifically seeks to address radicalization in educational institutions as its 2nd pillar going even further as to call for the development of early warning and early intervention measures. The implementation is relatively wanting at this point. Even when parents and/or teachers identify warning signs, this research has established that they do not always know where to go to seek redress or are equally fearful of perceived repercussions from the state or reprisals from the terrorist groups or sometimes both.

KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS

This study set out to appraise the NSCVE; provide a scorecard as it were primarily in a very fluid and dynamic world of terrorism and CVE. At the end several issues came to the fore;

Ease of access to the NSCVE document itself.

The NSCVE document is of itself not easy to locate. A search online will not immediately make it available and neither will it be found on the website of the NCTC. It therefore begs the question, if the people and/or agencies who are meant to derive their functions and activities from it cannot access it unless they go to the NCTC how will they go about it? Secondly, how will the general public measure the success of the NSCVE if they have no access to it? How will they know that activities by the state conform to the state's strategic direction or depart from it, arguably contributing to the narrative of perceived state oppression as a contributor to radicalization?

Compare this with a few jurisdictions that have their CT or CVE strategies publicly available:

- The US Joint Strategy on Countering violent Extremism is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/16_1028_S1_CVE_strategy.pdf
- The UK Strategy is available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470094/51859_Cm9148_PRINT.PDF
- The Nigerian Strategy is available at <http://ctc.gov.ng/pcve-nsa-book/>
- The Belgian Strategy is available at https://www.counterextremism.org/download_file/68/134/316/
- The French strategy is available at https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/document/document/2018/02/dossier_de_presse_-_comite_interministeriel_de_prevention_de_la_delinquance_et_de_la_radicalisation_-_23.02.2018.pdf
- The Lebanese strategy is available at http://www.pvelebanon.org/Resources/PVE_English.pdf

What is outstanding from these examples is that some of these countries have a longer history with terrorism than Kenya yet their policy documents are publicly available.

This research established that Kenya fears having the document made publicly available for fear of it falling into the wrong hands. Consequently there is a degree of disharmony and disunity of purpose in implementing the strategy.

Lack of monitoring and evaluation/ reporting

Whilst the NSCVE calls for M&E, this has not been done and the NCTC itself admits to this. This invariably means that it remains difficult to establish HOW TO PUT LIVE LINK IN PDF FILE whether or not the current strategy fits into the modern dynamic world of CT and CVE. Suffice to say, in realization of this, the NCTC has been working on a new strategy that will address the M&E gaps unearthed in the 2016 one. By the time of this report, the research found that the new strategy is almost ready for launch.

The County Action Plans are based on different strategies

Between 2016 and early 2019 with the assistance of the NCTC 11 counties had developed CAPs. These CAPs were derived from the 2016 NSCVE. However between January 2019 and December 2019, NCTC developed 36 CAPs to bring a total of 47 CAPs for all the counties. These subsequent 36 CAPs are derived on the yet to be launched new NSCVE. This begs the question, how responsive the CAPs are to the modern threat considering that they are informed by different 'NSCVEs'? Do they have unity of purpose?

Conversations on CT and CVE are shrouded in mystery

Throughout the research it became blatantly manifest that conversations on CT and CVE are had with hushed tones. A good number of would be respondents turned the researcher away, none of the questionnaires had the NAME section filled out (granted it was optional). Whatever fear and/or apprehension that people have is indicative of more work to be done so as to create a space where information flows freely and can attract the requisite action/reaction from the choice actors of the NSCVE. It is worth considering making the NSCVE and indeed the CAPs more accessible.

To be responsive to the fluid nature of CVE time is of the essence

It has been 4 years since the launch of the NSCVE and a comprehensive report on its success and achievements is not only desired but late. In appreciation the 4 years is too long a time to be considered responsive to the current threat, the NSCVE, has made a welcome decision to have the implementation period of the proposed new NSCVE pegged at 3 years. This would be short enough to appreciate the ever changing dynamics of CVE yet long enough to develop and implement workable activities. The new NSCVE equally creates clearer avenues for M&E and the research also established that it appreciates the role that gender plays in radicalization and CVE. This is an inclusion and improvement to the current NSCVE.

The platforms for radicalization have changed

While the 2016 NSCVE has identified, accurately so, the places where radicalizations occurs, there is a marked departure from radicalization taking place in places of worship, schools and the other listed places. The arena has shifted and radicalization is now happening online including self-radicalization. There is evidence coming through that indicates that this is the trend more so during this COVID 19 period. Is the NSCVE responsive to this? It should and anticipate the next move before the terrorists do.

The various activities drawn from the NSCVE must take advantage of the opportunities presented in the modern world and adapt accordingly.

The wide gap of knowledge between professionals and civilians

When it comes to knowledge on CVE and the NSCVE in particular, the general public is less aware of both as compared to the professional actors in the arena. This perhaps is occasioned by the general difficulty in accessing the NSCVE. It is difficult therefore for the public to put the government to account on the implementation of the NSCVE as well as to measure the impact on the public.

APPENDICES

The Questionnaire

NAME (OPTIONAL): _____

PLACE OF WORK: _____

WORK STATION (COUNTY): _____

DURATION OF SERVICE: _____

I. AWARENESS

1. Do you know what countering violent extremism is?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

2. How did you know what violent extremism is?
 - a. Through my line of work
 - b. Media
 - c. Internet
 - d. Other forms

3. Do you know if Kenya has a National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (NSCVE)?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

4. If your answer to Q.3 is YES, how did you know about Kenya's National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism?
 - a. Through my employer
 - b. Through GoK Ministries, Departments and Agencies
 - c. The internet
 - d. Mainstream print and electronic media
 - e. Others

5. If your answer to Q.4 is OTHERS, kindly elaborate on your response

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6. Who implements Kenya's National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism?

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7. Do you know if your current work station (County) has developed its own County Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

 8. Do you know if any other County has developed a County Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

 9. If your response to Q.8 is YES, which county or counties is/are these?

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II. THE PRIORITY AREAS OF THE NSCVE

10. The NSCVE seeks to inspire, rally and facilitate a local, communal, national and global rejection of extremist ideologies antithetical to Kenya’s nationhood and way of life as articulated in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and popularize narratives that minimise sympathy for terrorism as a means to change society or politics.

Do you think the NSCVE has been able to achieve this objective?

- a. Yes
- b. No

Please explain your answer

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11. The NSCVE seeks to promote patriotism for Kenya deeming it an obligation to defend Kenya, its religions and cultures from violent extremists.

Has the NSCVE been able to achieve this objective?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Partially

Please explain your answer

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12. The NSCVE seeks to enhance GoK support to local communities that are targeted by violent extremists by seeking to address communal grievances upon which violent extremist recruiters mobilise support.

Has the NSCVE been able to achieve this objective?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Partially

Please explain your answer

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13. The NSCVE seeks to develop radicalisation early warning and intervention measures especially in schools, places of worship and online.

Do you think the NSCVE has been able to meet this objective?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Partially

Please explain your answer citing examples where possible

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14. The NSCVE seek to give rehabilitation and reintegration support for individuals who disengage from violent extremism including the offering of amnesty, psychosocial support, education and training.

Do you think the NSCVE has been able to meet this objective?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Partially

Please explain your answer citing examples where possible

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15. The NSCVE seeks to develop expertise in non-coercive approaches to countering violent extremism (soft power), particularly in the security services.

Has it been able to achieve this?

- a. Yes
- b. No

16. For the respondents in the security sector, how would you rate the development of expertise in your own agency over the last 5 years?

- a. No improvement

- b. Slight improvement
- c. Noticeable improvement
- d. Well improved

17. What factors have contributed to your response in Q. 16 above?

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18. The NSCVE seeks to employ the effective utilisation of law enforcement to deter and prosecute radicalising individuals and institutions.

Over the last 5 years, has this been achieved?

- a. Yes
- b. No

Please explain your answer

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19. The NSCVE seeks to ensure that Kenya’s countering violent extremism actors have the benefit of a dynamic, action ready and research informed understanding of the evolution of violent extremist ideologies, organisational models and radicalisation methodologies.

Has this been achieved?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Partially
- d. I don’t know

Please explain your answer

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20. The NSCVE seeks to offer clear pathways and guidelines for citizens, communities, civil society, the private sector, media and multilateral and bilateral partners to effectively and productively engage CVE.

Are you aware of such pathways and guidelines?

- a. Yes
- b. No

21. If your answer to Q.20 is YES, what pathways and/or guidelines exist?

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III. IMPLEMENTATION AT COUNTY LEVEL

22. Counties are meant to prepare County strategies/ County action Plans to counter violent extremism. Would you say if your County strategy; where there is one, meets the priorities and expectations of the National Strategy as outlined in Q. 10 to Q. 21 above?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. I don't know

23. What would you say needs to be done at County level to implement the priority areas of the NSCVE?

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24. Would you say that after 5 years since the development of the NSCVE it has been successful or not?

- a. It has been successful
- b. It has been partially successful
- c. It has not been successful

25. What do you attribute your answer to Q. 24 to?

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